FROM RIO-92 TO COP-30: THREE DECADES BETWEEN THE IDEAL AND THE REALITY OF BRAZIL’S ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY

Written by Julien Dias and Published in Hydro Brasil Magazine

https://www.hydrobrasil.com.br/post/da-rio-92-%C3%A0-cop-30-tr%C3%AAs-d%C3%A9cadas-entre-o-ideal-e-a-realidade-da-pol%C3%ADtica-energ%C3%A9tica-brasileira

The hosting of COP-30 in Brazil, now concluded, has reopened an essential debate about the evolution — or lack thereof — of Brazilian energy and climate policy. More than three decades after Rio-92, since the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, through the Kyoto Protocol, COP-15 in Copenhagen, and Rio+20, the country has alternated between moments of diplomatic leadership and erratic, poorly strategic domestic decisions. The energy transition advanced in rhetoric but remained slow and fragmented in implementation. Examining this trajectory requires not only analyzing data from Brazil’s energy matrix but also considering the practical experience accumulated through pioneering decarbonization projects — such as the first CDM projects of the early 2000s.

The milestone of Rio-92 and the path to Kyoto

Rio-92 represented a turning point in the international environmental debate. From that event emerged the institutional framework that culminated in the Kyoto Protocol and the creation of carbon market mechanisms. While many nations viewed decarbonization as an opportunity for technological and industrial modernization, Brazil adopted a cautious stance, avoiding formal emission reduction commitments and failing to build solid industrial policies in the energy sector.

Brazil’s pioneering role in the Clean Development Mechanism

Between 2001 and 2007, Brazil was among the global leaders in the CDM, with the certification of small-scale projects — especially small hydropower plants (PCHs) — that demonstrated the financial viability of clean energy in practice. During that period, I was directly involved in developing emission reduction methodologies, drafting Project Design Documents, conducting validation and verification processes with entities such as DNV and BVQI, registering eleven projects with the CDM Executive Board, and negotiating carbon credits with European and Japanese organizations — experience documented in the article Taking Advantage of the Clean Development Mechanism.

The CDM showed that firm renewable sources could become a viable economic alternative when paired with market mechanisms. However, rather than turning this pioneering phase into a structural policy, Brazil squandered part of this progress.

Decisions that diverted Brazil from its natural path

Unlike countries that used the energy transition as a platform for development — such as the United States, Canada, Germany, and China — Brazil weakened sectors in which it was already competitive: ethanol, biomass, cogeneration, and small hydropower. As discussed in the text A Lost Opportunity, inconsistent policies dismantled entire production chains, leading to factory closures, loss of skilled jobs, and technological setbacks.

Meanwhile, the uncoordinated expansion of intermittent sources, without adequate compensation through reservoirs or biomass, increased dependence on fossil-fueled thermal plants to ensure system reliability. At the same time, the country became an importer of solar and wind technology, losing key opportunities for industrialization and the creation of green jobs.

The stagnation of Brazil’s energy matrix

Data on the national energy matrix reinforce the diagnosis of insufficient progress. The share of renewables in Brazil’s total energy supply remained practically stagnant over three decades: 45% in 1992, 40.8% in 2002, 44.7% in 2006 and 2010, 39.7% in 2014, 45.8% in 2018, 47.4% in 2022, and 49.1% in 2023. Over thirty years, the real gain was less than three percentage points.

At the same time, fossil sources — including carbon-intensive thermal plants — remained high: about 59% in 2002, 60% in 2014, and 51% in 2023. Even though Brazil holds one of the world’s largest hydropower and biomass potentials, it continues to operate a matrix highly dependent on fossil fuels.

In the power sector, the expansion of solar and wind represented an advance, but one lacking systemic planning. The absence of new hydropower reservoirs, which could have reduced the need for backup thermal plants, led to higher operating costs, greater fossil fuel use, and a less efficient energy matrix than possible.

The post-COP-30 challenge and the road ahead

With COP-30 now behind us, it has become clear that Brazil must turn its commitments into concrete and lasting action. The country stands at a crossroads that demands strategic vision, coherence, and political courage. Strengthening reservoir-based hydropower, revitalizing biomass, ethanol, biogas, and cogeneration, integrating solar and wind with robust planning, reinforcing the Free Contracting Environment (ACL) to value firm energy, and promoting reindustrialization through clean technologies are essential steps to regain lost leadership.

Thirty years after Rio-92, contradictions between discourse and reality persist. COP-30 offered Brazil a global showcase — but also a stark warning: being a climate reference requires technical and political consistency, along with tangible results. Brazil’s potential remains intact — what is lacking is the transformation of intention into action, planning into execution, and natural vocation into state strategy. If the country truly wishes to assume a leadership role in the global energy transition, the time to commit to that path is now.